

THE HUNTER BECOMES THE HUNTED

Protecting High-Value Research from Nation State Espionage

"Security researchers used to chase attackers. Today attackers chase researchers."

Dr Erdal Ozkaya



- CISO @Morgan State University
- President of Global CISO Forum
- 100 + Industry Certification
- Author 26 published books & many Security Certifications & Courseware



Dr. Erdal Ozkaya



My Books



Translated



The Strategic Shift

2010

BREAK IN



2026

LOG IN



Adversaries no longer need to exploit your OS;
they simply exploit your session.

The Awakening

The Core Paradox

Your greatest breakthrough **is also your greatest liability.**

The knowledge you hold — **0-days, proprietary tools, client intelligence, unpublished CVEs** — is worth millions to adversaries.

**The shift has happened:
From 'Breaking In' → To 'Logging In'**

312%

increase in researcher targeting

\$4.2M

avg value of stolen research IP

7

nation-state groups actively targeting labs in 2026

Why Researchers Matter

“Researchers hold cyber weapons before anyone else.”



- ◆ Zero-Day Repos: High-value unpatched vulnerabilities.
- 🔍 Detection Logic: Blueprints for defensive tools.
- 🔧 Exploit PoCs Functional code ready for weaponization.
- 📊 Threat Intel: Aggregated data on adversary movements.

Who's Coming For You

LAZARUS GROUP

REGION: DPRK

PRIMARY TARGETS

Crypto research, exploit brokers, vuln hunters

TTPs

LinkedIn personas, fake job offers, trojanized tools

COZY BEAR

REGION: Russia / SVR

PRIMARY TARGETS

Policy researchers, cloud security teams

TTPs

Supply chain poisoning, OAuth abuse, session hijacking

APT41

REGION: China / MSS

PRIMARY TARGETS

Vulnerability researchers, red team operators

TTPs


AI-driven spear-phish, weaponized VSCode extensions

| The Real Target: Expanded Lab



GitHub

Private repos containing sensitive toolchains and fuzzing logic.



Slack / Comms

Internal discussions on active hunts and client vulnerability reports.




Cloud Lab

Compromised VMs and staging environments for exploit testing.



Personal Laptop

The gateway to the lab — often the weakest link in the chain.



Conf Laptop

High-exposure hardware used in adversarial environments.



Identity

The goal: session tokens and browser-cached credentials.

**Your research isn't just a byproduct;
it's a nation - state primary objective.**

If they own the researcher, they own the
defenses of the next decade.

 DR ERDAL OZKAYA



THE ADVERSARY

Understanding the state-sponsored targeting cycle.

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AI-driven spear-phish,
weaponized VSCode extensions

The Nation-State Playbook



RECON

SOC ENG

IDENTITY

ACCESS

THEFT

Profiling researchers
via GitHub & Talks.

Deepfake calls &
collab requests.

AiTM & token theft
execution.

Persistent stealth lab
monitoring.

Exfiltration of 0-day
research.

Attack Vector #1: Session Token Theft

01

Initial Recon

Target's cloud tools and browser environment identified via OSINT

02

Malicious Payload

Trojanized npm package, browser extension, or PDF with embedded JS

03

Token Extraction

Session cookies and OAuth tokens exfiltrated silently to C2 server

04

Persistent Access

Adversary logs in as you — bypassing MFA entirely. Dwell begins.

⚠ MFA does NOT protect against session token theft — the attacker uses your authenticated session, not your password

Attack Vector #2: Weaponized Cloud Tooling

WEAPONIZED ATTACK SURFACES

VSCoDe Extensions

Malicious marketplace extensions exfiltrate code and credentials on save

GitHub Actions

Poisoned CI/CD workflows that capture secrets during build pipelines

Cloud IDE Plugins

Compromised Copilot-style tools sending code to adversary infrastructure

npm / PyPI Packages

Typosquatted packages targeting researcher dependencies

Docker Images

Backdoored base images in public registries used in lab environments

THE INSIGHT

"The tools you rely on to do your research have become the attack surface."

Adversaries now invest heavily in the developer toolchain ecosystem — the same environment researchers use daily. They understand that a researcher who trusts their tools implicitly will never question why their IDE plugin needs network access.

Attack Vector #3: AI-Driven Social Engineering

REAL ATTACK SCENARIO — 2026

A researcher receives a LinkedIn message from 'Dr. Sarah Chen, Senior Research Engineer at Google Project Zero.' The profile has 500+ connections, 3 years of history, published papers, and a verified-looking email. She proposes collaboration on an upcoming research project. The video call is flawless. The follow-up includes a shared repository. Everything checks out — until the repository contains a malicious tool.



Synthetic Personas

AI-generated researchers with years of fake publication history, social graphs, and deepfake video call capability



Hyper-Personalized Phishing

LLMs trained on your public writing, GitHub commits, and talks to craft lures indistinguishable from trusted contacts



Voice & Video Cloning

Real-time deepfake audio/video of known colleagues, conference calls with 'your manager' requesting urgent access

| Reconnaissance: You Are Leaking



GitHub

Revealing your tech stack and current research focus via commits.



LinkedIn

Mapping your professional network for targeted social engineering.



Papers

Demonstrating your deep expertise to invite "peer" collaboration.

"Researchers leak reconnaissance data about themselves every day."

| Scenario: Deepfake Social Engineering

The Impersonation

Attacker clones the voice of a known **Conference Organizer** or a senior **Microsoft Engineer**.




"Hey, we've reviewed your submission. We need to jump on a quick call to discuss the staging environment."

The "Actionable" Request

During a deepfake video/voice call, the attacker provides a "Secure Collaboration Link" (iTM Proxy).



"Just login here to sync your repo with our testing lab."





STRONTIUM *attack case study*



STRONTIUM Attacks

-  Attempt
-  Confirmed Infection

TARGET: Diplomat in the Middle East

From: <attacker>@<email provider.com>
To: <victim>@<email provider.com>
Subject: Re: Mission In Central African Republic

Dear Sir!

Please be advised that The Spanish Army personnel and a currently deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) and European EUFOR RCA mission will return to Spain in early

Visit

hxxp://eurasiaglobalnews.com/90670117-spains-armed
for the addition info.

Best regards,

*Capt. <omitted>, Defence Adviser, Public Diplomacy Div
<email provider.com>

Flash 0day



eurasiareview.com/03032015-spains-armed-forces-conclude-mission-in-central-african-republic

ATTACK: Stages of a 0-day Attack

1

Initial Exploit URL (Flash 0day)

TimeStamp	Alert	Data
2015/04/08 10:11:54	Unknown URL Report	hxxp:militaryadviser.org/hu/press-center/news/426728-ukraine/440136/

2

Kernel Mode Exploit (0day)

TimeStamp	Alert	Sha1	FileName	Parent Process
2015/04/08 10:12:11	Win32/ContextualDropIETemp	b22233684bc8aa939629f4cbabb18545c7121548	runrun.exe	iexplore.exe

3

Stage 1: Backdoor

TimeStamp	Alert	Sha1	FileName	Parent Process
2015/04/08 10:12:11	#LowFiContextRundllAppdata	ef1a7b1a92b7b00f77786b6a1bffc4e495ccf729	odserv.dll	rundll32.exe

4

Stage 2: Pass-the-Hash Module

TimeStamp	Alert	Sha1	FileName	Parent Process
2015/04/09 06:34:04	#HackTool;Win32/WDigest.Aldha	ca709ec79ee0518b77f161bc8bab8847c889cb88	psw.exe	rundll32.exe

ANATOMY OF AN **ATTACK**



BUSINESS DISRUPTION


LOST PRODUCTIVITY

DATA THEFT

ESPIONAGE, LOSS OF IP


RANSOM

ANATOMY OF AN **ATTACK: STRONTIUM**



Theft of sensitive information, disruption of government.

ANATOMY OF AN **ATTACK: STRONTIUM**



ENDGAME

Theft of sensitive information, disruption of government.

ANATOMY OF AN **ATTACK: STRONTIUM**




Theft of sensitive information, disruption of government.



COMPROMISING THE LAB

Technical deep dive into current attack flows.

| Attack Flow: Token Theft



MFA protects the LOGIN. MFA does NOT protect the ACTIVE SESSION.

TOKEN THEFT

HACKED

| Why Token Theft Wins

What MFA Protects

- ✓ Initial Authentication
- ✓ Credential Replay
- ✓ Password Guessing

What MFA Ignores

- ✗ Session Cookie Reuse
- ✗ Reverse Proxy (AiTM)
- ✗ Stolen Auth Tokens



Weaponized: Browser Infostealers

RedLine / Vidar

Standardized malware for bulk cookie extraction.

Lumma / RisePro


Advanced stealth-focused stealers targeting dev tools.

The Prize

GitHub PATs, AWS Keys, and Chrome Session Databases.



| GitHub: The Central Target



Exploit PoCs The liquid gold of the researcher lab.




Fuzzing Tools: Your proprietary logic for finding bugs.



Unreleased Reports: Vulnerability data before it goes to the vendor.



Research Supply Chain Poisoning



Your "defensive tools" are becoming "offensive gateways."

CROWN JEWEL FRAMEWORK

Applying CISO governance to researcher data.

Crown Jewels Framework

EYES ONLY

Live exploits, 0-days, client reports under NDA

CRITICAL

Unpublished CVEs, proprietary tools, pentest findings

SENSITIVE

Research notes, tool source code, collaboration details

PUBLIC


Published papers, blog posts, public repos

IDENTIFICATION QUESTION:

Ask of every asset — 'If this data were in an adversary's hands tomorrow, what's the blast radius?'

| Research Data Mapping

Data Mapping



// DATA FLOW PATHWAY

1. Research Workstation
2. GitHub Enterprise / Private Repos
3. Cloud Lab Staging
4. Shared Data Lake / Fuzzing Results
5. Final Report Drafts (Client Vault)

RESEARCH OPSEC FRAMEWORK

The core defensive model for modern security teams.

OPSEC Countermeasures

01

Identity & Session Management

- FIDO2/Passkeys — phishing-resistant, device-bound auth
- Short-lived token policies (15-min max for sensitive systems)
- Browser profile isolation per research project

02

Environment Isolation

- Air-gapped VM for Crown Jewel research
- Separate hardware for internet-facing tools
- Zero-trust network segmentation in the lab

03

Supply Chain Hygiene

- Private package registry with verified packages only
- Extension allowlist enforcement in VSCode
- Egress monitoring from all development environments

04

AI Social Engineering Defense

- Out-of-band verification for all new collaboration requests
- Code word protocol with known colleagues before sharing
- Deepfake detection checklist for video calls

The Research OPSEC Model



Defensive Layers

1. **Identity Security:** The foundation of access.
2. **Environment Security:** Hardening the workspace.
3. **Data Protection:** Encrypting the crown jewels.
4. **Monitoring:** Observing behavioral anomalies.
5. **Response:** Rapid containment of token theft.

Research OPSEC Framework

TOP 5 ACTIONS — THIS WEEK

- 1 Map your Crown Jewels — classify every active research asset this week
- 2 Deploy FIDO2/passkeys for all systems touching sensitive research data
- 3 Audit every VSCode extension, npm package, and cloud integration in your lab
- 4 Establish out-of-band verification protocol for new collaboration requests
- 5 Run a researcher-compromise tabletop exercise with your leadership team

THE MINDSET SHIFT

"Stop asking: Am I a target?"

Start asking: What would my adversary want most from me today — and is it protected?"

**Research OPSEC is not paranoia.
It is professional hygiene.**

THREAT HUNTING



Proactively finding the adversary in the lab.

| Espionage Indicators (IoBs)

Midnight Access

Logins between 01:00 and 04:00 local time.

Mass Cloning

User account cloning >10 private repos in <5 minutes.

New Tokens

Creation of Personal Access Tokens without a Change Request.

| Example Hunt Query: GitHub

```
SELECT user, action, data_size,  
src_ip  
FROM github_audit_logs  
WHERE action = 'repo.clone'  
AND data_size > 5GB  
AND device_id NOT IN (known_devices)  
AND auth_method = 'token'
```

Detecting high-volume exfiltration via stolen PATs.

REAL CASE STUDIES

Learning from the front lines of research espionage.

CASE STUDY: THE LAZARUS RAPPORT

// TARGET: THE SECURITY COMMUNITY

Strategic Rapport Attacks

The Lazarus Group (Diamond Sleet) executed a multi-year campaign (2021-2024) specifically targeting vulnerability researchers.

-  **Persona Aging:** High-credibility Twitter/X and LinkedIn profiles built over months.
-  **Collab Lure:** Sending malicious Visual Studio projects for "joint research."
-  **Payload:** Custom DLLs executed via build events in VS Projects.



| CASE STUDY: APT29 IDENTITY THEFT



IdP Targeting

Midnight Blizzard (APT29) targets Cloud Identity Providers (Entra ID) to harvest OAuth tokens and session cookies.



OAuth Persistence

Granting malicious "Research Tool" apps permanent access to private GitHub and Microsoft 365 environments.

Tenant Pivot

Using one compromised researcher account to move laterally into high-value corporate tenants.



| CASE STUDY: OPERATION DREAM JOB

75%

Increased AI Credibility



// PHANTOM RECRUITING CAMPAIGN

Targeted Fake Interviews

State-sponsored actors impersonate HR from high-tier tech firms (Google, Microsoft) to target security researchers.

-  **Weaponized JD:** Malicious "Job Description" PDFs containing infostealer payloads.
-  **Deepfake Calls:** AI-generated voices used for pre-interview screening calls.
-  **Technical Test:** Delivering malicious ISO files as "coding assignments."

IF ATTACKERS STEAL

THE RESEARCH...

THEY STEAL

TOMORROW'S DEFENSES.

Cybersecurity Threat Hunting Dashboard

Operational Guidelines

- Update hunt team in real-time
- Document all findings with evidence
- Link to research
- Maintain all findings



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Threat Hunts

All Threat Hunts Active Alerts Hunt Calendar By Threat Type Timeline

Threat Hunt Name	Status	Owner	Start Date	End Date	Lead Member	Threat Type
Windows Precision Detection	Planning	Orhan	June 21, 2023	June 23, 2023		Malware
APT Activity Hunt - Q2	In Progress	HUB	June 17, 2023	June 24, 2023		APT / Cloud

Dankie Faleminderit **Shukran** Chnorakaloutioun Hvala شڪرا لك Blagodaria

Děkuji **Tak** Bedankt **Tānan** Kiitos **Merci** Danke Ευχαριστώ **A dank**

Mahalo תודה **Dhanyavād** Köszönöm **Takk** **Terima kasih** **Grazie** **Grazzi**

Thank you!



DR ERDAL OZKAYA

감사합니다 Paldies Choukrane Ačiū **Благодарам** ありがとうございます

谢谢 Баярлалаа **Dziękuję** **Obrigado** Mulțumesc **Спасибо** **Ngiyabonga**

Ďakujem **Tack** Nandri Kop khun **Teşekkür ederim** Дякую **Хвала** **Diolch**

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